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If an Interpreter Mistranslates in a Courtroom 
and There is No Recording, Does Anyone Care?: 




One of the most valuable and influential pieces of evidence in any criminal trial is 
the testimony of witnesses. Accurate testimony is critical for any defendant, but limited-
English proficiency (LEP) defendants face an additional challenge that English-speaking 
defendants do not: LEP defendants are often entirely dependent on the court-appointed 
interpreter to communicate with the court, the fact finder, and their attorney, as well as 
understand the allegations and evidence presented against them. Because of this, the 
court-appointed interpreter’s job is critical. They have the responsibility to faithfully and 
accurately translate testimony for the court and place LEP defendants on equal footing 
with native English speakers.1 Unsurprisingly, significant problems occur when an 
interpreter mistranslates the defendant’s testimony and no one in the courtroom notices. 
While courts typically treat the interpretation of testimony as an evidentiary issue, errors 
in interpretation may impinge key constitutional rights. Further, the trial court’s failure to 
record non-English trial testimony and appellate courts’ abdication of responsibility to 
review these errors de novo compounds the harm of the interpreter’s mistranslation. 
This Comment explores when and how appellate courts review errors in court 
interpretation, addresses the significant deficiencies of current responses by courts, and 
suggests ways courts can better defend the constitutional rights of LEP defendants and 
defendants relying on the testimony of LEP witnesses. In particular, this Comment 
reviews how appellate courts assess mistranslation in three specific circumstances: (1) 
when an interpreter mistranslates testimony by the defendant, if he or she elects to take 
the stand; (2) when an interpreter mistranslates the testimony of an LEP witness in a 
criminal trial; and (3) when an interpreter, providing simultaneous translation of the 
                                                 
* I would like to thank Professor Rountree for her invaluable insight on criminal process and Meredith 
Hurley, Kathleen DeAmico, and Erika Dirk for their aid and advice throughout the editing process. I owe 
the inspiration for this Comment to Judge Sheila Finnegan, who gave me the opportunity to witness the 
challenges and rewards of court interpretation firsthand. Lastly, I must thank my mother, my tireless editor, 
who shares my fascination with language, and my father for his unwavering support and encouragement. 
All errors are my own. 
 
1 In court interpreter scholarship, “interpretation” and “translation” sometimes describe two distinct 
functions. However, in this Comment, I use the terms interchangeably to refer to when an interpreter makes 
an error while translating live testimony in a courtroom. Thus “misinterpretation” refers to mistakes made 
while translating one language into another, not to any legal interpretation errors. 
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courtroom proceedings for the defendant, mistranslates something said by a witness, an 
attorney, or the judge.  
Part I reviews who has the right to an interpreter and who bears the costs of 
interpreting services for criminal defendants in federal courts and state courts in 
California, Illinois, and Texas. These states were chosen because of their volume and 
diversity of criminal matters, their high number of non-English speakers, and the variety 
of languages spoken in these jurisdictions.2 Part II highlights the problems with treating 
interpretation errors as evidentiary issues and courts’ failure to preserve them on the 
record. These factors lead appellate courts to apply deferential standards of review and to 
abdicate their duty to protect core constitutional rights. Part III offers examples of courts’ 
approaches to interpreter mistranslations, drawing from federal appellate courts and the 
state courts of California, Illinois, and Texas in order to identify the root causes of the 
courts’ deficient protection of LEP defendants’ constitutional rights. Part IV offers 
practical and effective solutions that courts, both at the trial and appellate level, could 
adopt to remedy this problem and protect LEP defendants’ basic constitutional rights. 
Lastly, this Comment will address concerns regarding the costs of implementing these 
suggestions and propose economical solutions. 
I. BACKGROUND: WHO HAS A RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER AND AT WHAT COST?  
Before addressing appellate courts’ treatment of errors in interpretation, it is useful 
to understand when courts are required to appoint interpreters. As an initial matter, the 
right to an interpreter is a statutory or constitutional guarantee in both the federal court 
system and in California, Illinois, and Texas state courts.3 These statutes reflect state and 
federal courts’ recognition that an interpreter is required to protect LEP defendants’ basic 
constitutional rights. As developed below, however, this recognition is not reflected in 
                                                 
2 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 2017 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS, 2006–
2007 THROUGH 2015–2016 (2017), 20 http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2017-Court-Statistics-
Report.pdf (“California’s court system serves a population of more than 39 million people—about 12 
percent of the total U.S.  
population . . . .”); http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx (select “criminal” at the top of the page, then 
select “statewide criminal caseloads and rates” as the “chart/table” and “Illinois” or “California” on the left 
side) (In Illinois, 286, 567 criminal cases were filed in 2016; In California, 1,364,529 cases were filed in 
2016); TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY, FISCAL YEAR 
2017, 31 (2017) http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1441398/ar-fy-17-final.pdf#page=111 (reporting that, in 
Texas, 6,649,919 criminal cases were filed in 2017); Language Diversity in the U.S.: Most Multilingual 
States, ACCREDITED LANGUAGE SERVICES (Sept 14., 2016), 
https://www.accreditedlanguage.com/2016/09/14/language-diversity-in-the-us-most-multilingual-states/ 
(indicating that Texas, Illinois, and California rank among the top ten most multilingual states, with 
California and Texas claiming the first and second spot, respectively); see also Christopher Ingraham, 
Millions of U.S. Citizens Don’t Speak English to One Another. That’s Not a Problem, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (May 21, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/05/21/millions-of-u-s-
citizens-dont-speak-english-to-each-other-thats-not-a-problem/?utm_term=.1942d0e83aef (compiling and 
analyzing data showing California, Texas, and Illinois are three of the most linguistically diverse states 
with 10–35.2% of U.S. citizens eighteen years of age and older speaking a language other than English at 
home). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2012); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1 (1993); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 38.30(a) (West 2015)  
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courts’ treatment of claims of interpreter error, since courts rarely acknowledge the 
constitutional implications of mistranslations. This discrepancy is difficult to rationalize 
because, if the absence of an interpreter violates constitutional rights, significant errors in 
translation could similarly violate those same rights. Nonetheless, courts hesitate to 
recognize this basic principle. 
A. Interpretive Services in Federal Court 
In federal court the right to an interpreter is statutory. The Court Interpreter Act4 
provides an interpreter in “judicial proceedings instituted by the United States” where the 
defendant or a witness “(A) speaks only or primarily a language other than the English 
language; or (B) suffers from a hearing impairment . . . .”5 Under the Act, the court can 
appoint an interpreter sua sponte, upon a determination that the individual’s language or 
hearing difficulty would “inhibit [their] comprehension of the proceedings . . . 
communication with counsel, or the presiding judicial officer, or . . . inhibit such witness’ 
comprehension of questions and the presentation of such testimony.”6  
The Act also contains an audio recording provision.7 In addition to putting the 
federal judiciary on notice that it should prepare for and permit electronic sound 
recordings, the provision reflects an understanding that this record may be necessary.8 A 
court may order audio recording if, “[u]pon the motion of a party, the presiding judicial 
officer” determines it reasonable.9 “In making this determination, the presiding judicial 
officer shall consider, among other things, the qualifications of the interpreter and prior 
experience in interpretation of court proceedings . . . .”10  
Finally, the Court Interpreter Act contains a provision that supplies funding for 
interpretive services. The Act instructs the Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts to pay funds into the federal judiciary to establish the program and 
provide for qualified interpreters on behalf of the defendant in proceedings instituted by 
the United States government.11 In contrast, section (g)(3) of the Act specifies that the 
Attorney General, using funds from the Department of Justice, must pay for interpretive 
services utilized on behalf of government witnesses.12 Section (g)(4) adds that parties to 
cases not initiated by the federal government who wish to use the services of a court 
interpreter must bear the cost.13 Section (d)(1) of the Act articulates that an interpreter is 
provided to ensure the defendant can understand the proceedings, the presentation of 
testimony, and to allow the defendant to communicate with his or her attorney as well as 
the judge.14 Although the Act does not explicitly categorize the potential harms as 
constitutional, the purpose of the Act reflects concern for LEP defendants’ confrontation 
                                                 
4 § 1827(d)(1). 
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 § 1827(d)(2). 
8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 § 1827(g)(1). 
12 § 1827(g)(3). 
13 § 1827(g)(4). 
14 § 1827(d)(1). 
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clause right,15 right to counsel,16 and right to aid in his or her own defense.17  As will be 
addressed in Part II, federal courts’ treatment of interpretation errors as evidentiary does 
not comport with the Court Interpreter Act’s allusion to constitutional harms. 
Although the Court Interpreter Act implicitly recognizes that the absence of an 
interpreter impinges constitutional rights,18 this Comment will demonstrate federal courts 
do not acknowledge that interpreter errors may have the same effect. However, the 
presence of the audio recording provision suggests a path to assuring constitutional 
rights—recording non-English testimony for comparison with the interpreter’s 
translation. As discussed below, recording both the interpreted and original statements 
enable defendants to show reviewing courts precisely how the erroneous interpretation 
violated their right to a fair trial.  
B. Interpretive Services in California State Court 
In California, the right to an interpreter is guaranteed by the state constitution.19 
While the California constitution enumerates this right in a section called “felony 
prosecution,” California courts expanded the right to cover defendants in all criminal 
matters, including lesser misdemeanor charges.20 Article I, § 14 provides, “A person 
unable to understand English who is charged with a crime has a right to an interpreter 
throughout the proceedings.”21 Corresponding California Supreme Court cases elucidate 
                                                 
15 See Siobhan C. Murphy & Daniel Gilman, Sixth Amendment at Trial, 88 GEO. L.J. 1442, 1448 (2000) 
(“The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant the right to directly encounter 
hostile witnesses, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right to be present at any stage of 
the trial that would enable the defendant to effectively cross-examine adverse witnesses.”) 
16 See Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 381, 388 (2009) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
340 (1963)) (“The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence’ . . . . By the early 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court had ‘construed this [amendment] to mean that in federal courts 
counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and 
intelligently waived.’ ”).  
17 Timothy P. O'Neill, Vindicating the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify at Criminal Trial: The 
Need for an on-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 820 (1990) (“[T]he right of the defendant 
to testify ‘has sources in several provisions of the Constitution’ . . . . [It is] a fundamental part of the 
adversary system and [is] thus guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.”) 
18 See Court Interpreter’s Act: Hearing on H.R. 10228, H.R. 10129, and S. 1315 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 4–6 (1978) (statement of 
Rep. Fred Richmond, sponsoring witness of the Bilingual, Hearing, and Speech Impaired Court 
Interpreter’s Act) (“[The Bilingual, Hearing, and Speech Impaired Court Interpreter’s Act] would insure 
[sic] that a qualified interpreter be present whenever a person who does not communicate in English is 
involved in a Federal court proceeding. Unfortunately, with the deaf community, this communication 
problem has long been overlooked because it is invisible. Our legal system has not lived up to the basic 
American ideal of equal justice and fairness to all. Deaf and non-English-speaking Americans have been 
denied the fundamental right to a fair trial due to their inability to understand the court proceedings. The 
Constitution guarantees every American access to the Federal courts through the fifth and sixth 
amendments. If language-handicapped Americans are not given the constitutionally established access to 
understand and participate in their own defense, then we have failed to carry out a fundamental American  
premise—fairness and due process for all.”). 
19 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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this provision, clarifying that the right to an interpreter has constitutional justifications, 
including “rights to due process, to confrontation, to effective assistance of counsel, and 
to be present at trial.”22 While defendants do not bear the cost of their interpreters in 
California courts, they must demonstrate “an affirmative showing of need . . . .”23 The 
burden of “affirmative showing of need” is discharged by demonstrating an inability to 
understand English. A mere statement of being unable to understand English, coupled 
with a request for an interpreter is not necessarily sufficient to trigger appointment of an 
interpreter.24 
While in California the right to an interpreter is more explicitly tied to the 
constitution, in practice, appellate courts overwhelmingly treat interpreter errors as 
evidentiary issues, accord significant deference to the trial judge, and thereby abdicate 
their responsibility to secure the rights of LEP defendants. Particularly troubling are 
California appellate courts’ inquiries into LEP defendants’ needs for interpretation 
services and admonitions against use of interpreters for courtroom gamesmanship.25 As 
will be reviewed at greater length, these interrogations are both unfair and beyond 
appellate courts’ proper scope.  
C. Interpretive Services in Illinois State Court 
Unlike California’s implicit recognition of the right to an interpreter for 
misdemeanor criminal defendants, Illinois law explicitly recognizes this right.26 The 
relevant Illinois statute, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/1, provides: 
 
[w]henever any person accused of committing a felony or misdemeanor is 
to be tried in any court of this State, the court shall upon its own motion or 
that of defense or prosecution determine whether the accused is capable of 
understanding the English language and is capable of expressing himself 
in the English language so as to be understood directly by counsel, court 
or jury.27  
 
If the trial court judge determines that the defendant is “incapable of so understanding or 
so expressing himself,” an interpreter “whom [the defendant] can understand and who 
                                                 
22 People v. Romero, 187 P.3d 56, 73 (Cal. 2008) (citing People v. Rodriguez, 728 P.2d 202, 205 (1986)). 
23 In re Raymundo B., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1447, 1453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also People v. Sanchez, No. 
H043523, 2017 WL 2982391, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13), review denied (Sept. 20, 2017) (requiring 
defendant to demonstrate an affirmative showing of need because only defendants who show they do not 
understand English are entitled to an interpreter). 
24 Raymundo B., 203 Cal. App. 3d at 1453 (requiring “[c]onclusive proof” of the inability to understand 
English in order for an interpreter to be appointed. The Raymundo court found by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant, a juvenile, spoke and understood English, and that, even though an interpreter 
had been appointed for the defendant in the past, this was not sufficient proof of his need.). 
25 See People v. Partida, 122 P.3d 765, 766 (Cal. 2005) (specific and contemporaneous objection is needed 
to prevent abuse of interpreter services as a trial strategy); People v. Sokau, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 862 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (formal objection needed to prevent defense counsel from engaging in 
gamesmanship). 
26 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1 (1993). 
27 Id.  
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understand[s] him” will be appointed.28 In its Language Access Policy, the Illinois 
Supreme Court clarified the qualifications for certified interpreters, qualified interpreters, 
registered interpreters, and unregistered interpreters, in descending order of credentials.29 
The court’s policy is that “[w]henever a foreign language interpreter is appointed by the 
court, a certified or qualified interpreter shall be provided if one is available.”30 A 
certified interpreter is one who “is certified and in good standing by the federal courts or 
by a state having a certification program . . . .”31 However, the Illinois Supreme Court 
permits use of an unregistered interpreter “if the court made reasonable efforts to obtain a 
certified, qualified or registered interpreter [and one] was not reasonably available, or if 
good cause is otherwise shown.”32  
In addition to the standards pronounced by the Illinois Supreme Court, at least one 
circuit court devised its own interpreter qualifications. The Twenty-Second Judicial 
Circuit Court of Illinois provides that official court interpreters can be staff or contractual 
interpreters, but must adhere to a standard of conduct, which includes impartiality, 
confidentiality, and disclosure of any conflicts of interest.33 Despite Illinois courts’ 
willingness to accept varying levels of interpreter competency, like federal and California 
courts, in Illinois, “[t]he appointment of an interpreter in a felon or misdemeanor [sic] 
where incarceration may result is at county expense regardless of whether the defendant 
is indigent.”34  
The Seventh Circuit, reviewing Illinois statute 140/1, affirmed that the right to an 
interpreter flows from the state constitutional right to due process.35 The court held that, 
even for the lowest level misdemeanors, “Illinois law requires the court to ‘determine 
whether the accused is capable of understanding the English language and is capable of 
expressing himself in the English language so as to be understood directly by counsel, 
court or jury.’ ”36 This is because criminal defendants have a due process right to 
understand “what is said at trial and to communicate with counsel” and an interpreter is 
necessary to guard this right.37 Due process is assured because, mistranslations 
notwithstanding, an interpreter enables the defendant to communicate with his or her 
counsel and understand the proceedings.38  
D. Interpretive Services in Texas State Court 
Texas guarantees an interpreter in criminal proceedings where it is “determined that 
a person charged or a witness does not understand and speak the English language . . . 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 ILL. SUPREME COURT, LANGUAGE ACCESS POLICY 3 (2016 ed.), 
http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/CivilJustice/LanguageAccess/Language_Access_Policy.pdf. 
30 Id. at 5. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 ILL. 22D JUD. CIR. CT. R. 10.14(d)–(e). 
34 Id. at 10.14(a).  
35 United States v. Jimenes, 852 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Mendoza v. United States, 755 F.3d 
821, 828 (7th Cir. 2014)).  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
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.”39 This determination, left to the discretion of the trial court, may be sua sponte or 
prompted by motion of either party.40 However, unlike the federal court system where 
interpreters must be certified or qualified, in Texas courts an interpreter is not “required 
to have specific qualifications or training” but only “sufficient skill in translating and 
familiarity with the use of slang.”41 The Texas Criminal Code provides that interpreters 
are paid from the general fund of the county.42  
Although the right to an interpreter is guaranteed by statute or constitution in 
federal court and the state courts of California, Illinois, and Texas, the most pressing 
problem arises in courts’ review of claims of errors in interpretation. The problem is that 
LEP defendants’ constitutional rights cannot be protected merely by assuring a right to an 
interpreter when there are no viable safeguards in place to monitor and review the 
interpreters’ performances. With safeguards absent, courts are unable to redress 
constitutional deprivations resulting from mistranslations. 
II. THE PROBLEMS: RECOGNIZING ERRORS IN INTERPRETATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES AND PRESERVING THEM FOR APPEAL 
There are two problems with courts’ current treatment of errors in interpretation. 
First, courts misclassify errors in interpretation as evidentiary matters and therefore apply 
a deferential standard of review. Second, the mistranslation does not appear on the 
record. The court reporter includes only English testimony in the court transcript, and the 
proceedings are rarely audio recorded. 
In the typical court setting, the interpreter is the only court-appointed actor present 
who understands both the LEP defendant and the English proceedings. Although 
occasionally there are multiple interpreters present in the courtroom, such as when they 
are performing different functions or switching shifts, there is no statute requiring this 
practice in California, Illinois, Texas, or the federal courts. Consequently, errors in 
interpretation go unnoticed because no one is responsible for monitoring the interpreter’s 
work.43  
Furthermore, even when errors in translation are caught at the trial court level, it is 
not because of a procedural safeguard, but instead through happenstance and 
serendipity.44 For example, the LEP criminal defendant may know enough English to 
                                                 
39 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.30(a) (West 2015). 
40 Id. 
41 Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App. 1999) (citing art. 38.30); see also Martins v. State, 52 S.W.3d 
459, 473 n.12 (Tex. App. 2001) (citing art. 38.30(a)) (“Article 38.30(a) . . . provides that a defendant can 
nominate another person to serve as an intermediary between himself and the interpreter in the event that 
the only available interpreter is not considered to possess adequate interpreting skills for the particular 
situation or the interpreter is not familiar with the use of slang.”). 
42 Art. 38.30(b). 
43 See, e.g., People v. Nunez-Sharp, No. B264843, 2017 WL 1007583, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 
15), review denied (June 14, 2017) (“Although the trial court corrected that error, it is reasonable to assume 
there were additional errors that went unnoticed.”). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 397 F. App'x 583, 588 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreter admitted to 
mistranslation); People v. Aguirre, No. B231368, 2012 WL 3332366, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2012) 
(other interpreters identified and called attention to mistranslation); Gonzalez v. State, 752 S.W.2d 695, 698 
(Tex. App. 1988) (bilingual defense attorney identified translation issues).  
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identify and raise issues of mistranslation, or another interpreter performing a different 
role in the courtroom may catch the error. Unsurprisingly, neither of these “mechanisms” 
adequately protect the constitutional rights of LEP defendants.  
A. Misclassification of Interpretation Errors as Evidentiary Matters 
Only official translations provided by the court interpreter are admitted as 
evidence.45 In most cases, non-English testimony is not reviewed or preserved. As a 
result, when a defendant claims the interpreter mistranslated testimony, reviewing courts 
overwhelmingly treat the error as evidentiary.46 As discussed below, this response 
misunderstands the nature of the interpreter’s error and ignores its impact on a 
defendant’s constitutional rights. Further, misclassifying interpretation errors as 
evidentiary has severe consequences: it triggers doctrines requiring timely and specific 
objections at trial and permits a highly deferential standard of review on appeal.47  
In addition to obscuring the significance of mistranslations, treating them as 
evidentiary issues accords unwarranted deference to trial court determinations. Unlike 
other evidentiary issues, LEP defendants cannot rely upon the trial court adversarial 
system to uncover and rectify deficiencies in interpretation. The trial court judge’s 
position within the court system does not confer an inherent advantage when rectifying 
an error in interpretation, since what is required is a comparison between the LEP 
defendant’s non-English testimony and the English translation. Therefore, deference to 
the trial court is simply not logical in this context. 
1. The Objection Requirement 
Courts require trial attorneys to make timely and specific objections to evidentiary 
issues; otherwise, they are procedurally defaulted and may not be raised on appeal.48 
                                                 
45 See NINTH CIRCUIT  MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3.19 (NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMM. 2010) (instructing jury to rely only on English interpretation of testimony and to disregard non-
English testimony even if they understood it); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 379 (1991) (official 
translation alone is evidence). See also CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 121 (JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIF. 
2018) (“An interpreter will provide a translation for [the jury] at the time that the testimony is given. [The 
jury] must rely on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the language spoken 
by the witness.”); People v. Cabrera, 230 Cal. App. 3d 300, 304 (1991) (juror committed misconduct by 
relying on her personal translation of non-English testimony rather than the interpreter).  
46 See, e.g., Charles M. Grabau & Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Protecting the Rights of Linguistic 
Minorities: Challenges to Court Interpretation, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 227, 260, 288 (1996) (“If the 
interpreter is incompetent, the judge is likely to be presented with evidentiary problems . . . . Courts have, 
for evidentiary purposes, considered a court interpreter to be a witness, an expert witness, an agent, or an 
officer of the court.”);  
Will Turner, Qué Dijo? The Plain Error Rule's Effective Denial of Due Process to Non-English-Speaking 
Criminal Defendants, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 141, 150–51 (2013) (“The eradication of the plain error 
rule in this context would be a beginning towards ensuring due process to non-English-speaking defendants 
. . . . [T]he [de novo review] rule would protect defendants from having their language barrier define the 
results of their trial.”). 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 179 F. App'x 362, 363 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying plain error standard 
of review); United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 1990) (requiring contemporaneous 
objections to mistranslations). 
48 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (“A party may claim error . . . only if . . . a party, on the record timely 
objects . . . and states the specific ground.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 353(a) (providing that a trial court 
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Because courts consider errors in translation as evidentiary issues, this same requirement 
is in force. However, as a result of misclassifying the error, appellate courts require 
attorneys to object to unrecognizable errors in translation that often no one in the 
courtroom is qualified to identify. Interpreters are used when the trial court determines 
the defendant and other court actors do not share a common language. Incongruously, 
those same court actors are required to identify and call the court’s attention to errors the 
interpreter makes in a language they do not speak. When they fail to do that, the 
defendant has little chance for a remedy.49 
On some level, courts recognize the absurdity of expecting attorneys to object to 
mistranslations in a foreign language. This implicit recognition reveals itself in two ways: 
first, courts impute the objection requirement from the attorney to the criminal defendant; 
second, courts consistently deny ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on 
attorneys’ failure to object to errors in interpretation.50 Both responses reveal courts’ 
awareness that, in some ways, interpreter error is not a standard evidentiary issue and 
requires different treatment. However, these responses by the court only exacerbate the 
problem. 
By putting the onus on the criminal defendant to object to mistranslations, appellate 
courts conclude that if no objection is made and the defendant does not raise this issue 
during trial, more deference should be paid to the trial court.51 This skepticism fuels 
appellate courts’ propensity for finding any error harmless and their reluctance to reverse 
a conviction.52 By doing this, appellate courts abdicate their responsibility to protect 
constitutional rights in two ways. First, relying on criminal defendants to object to 
mistranslations only protects the constitutional rights of defendants who are proficient 
enough with English to recognize mistranslations. This conclusion is at odds with the 
purpose of providing court interpretation: constitutional protections should not depend on 
English proficiency.  
                                                                                                                                                 
“finding shall not be set aside . . . unless . . .[t]here appears of record an objection . . . so stated as to make 
clear the specific ground of the objection”); ILL. R. EVID. 103(b)(1) (providing that a “contemporaneous 
trial objection . . . must be made to preserve a claim of error for appeal”); TEX. R. APP. PROC. 33.1(a)(1) 
(requiring that, in order for a party to appeal, the trial court record must reflect a “timely request, objection, 
or motion”); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (providing that a party must timely object or move to strike evidence 
and state specific ground for such request); People v. Partida, 122 P.3d 765, 768 (Cal. 2005) (interpreting 
California Evidence Code § 353 and holding that “[i]n accordance with this statute, we have consistently 
held that the ‘defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection’ on the ground asserted on appeal 
makes that ground not cognizable”) (quoting People v. Seijas, 114 P.3d 742, 749 (Cal. 2005)); People v. 
Ramos, 920 N.E.2d 504, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (“It is axiomatic that a defendant 
must object contemporaneously . . . in order to preserve issues for [appellate] review.”). 
49 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).  
50 See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Use or Nonuse of Interpreter at 
Prosecution of Foreign Language Speaking Defendant, 79 A.L.R. 4th 1102, § 9 (1990) (summarizing cases 
where counsel was not ineffective despite use of an incompetent interpreter or failure to object to use of an 
incompetent interpreter). 
51 See Turner, supra note 46, at 142 (“When criminal defendants fail to object to 
inadequate interpretation at trial, reviewing courts will apply the plain error standard of review.”). 
52 See id. at 143 (“[A] defendant's failure to object to inadequate interpretation at trial triggers heavy 
presumptions against that defendant from obtaining relief on appeal under both the Court Interpreters Act 
and Strickland.”). 
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Second, relying on the defendant to come forward with errors in interpretation 
requires the defendant to police the work of an interpreter, who is compensated by the 
federal or state government. This further burdens LEP defendants with a task their 
English-speaking counterparts do not face. While LEP criminal defendants should be 
encouraged to point out any mistranslations they recognize, their right to an appeal 
should not hinge on their ability to monitor the interpretation of a professional in court, 
particularly when their liberty hangs in the balance.53  
Courts’ subliminal recognition of this absurdity also appears in their treatment of 
Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claims.54 Defendants pursue a Strickland 
claim by demonstrating that their counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced their 
defense.55 Despite the fact that ineffective assistance of counsel is justifiably raised in 
response to attorneys’ failure to object to evidentiary issues56—and errors in 
interpretation are categorized as evidentiary issues—very few claims on this basis are 
successful.57 Paradoxically, an attorney’s failure to object to mistranslation is insufficient 
to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but it is sufficient to bar the 
defendant from appealing and redressing the deprivation of his or her constitutional 
rights.58 By rejecting Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claims, courts 
acknowledge that it is unreasonable to require an attorney to object to errors in translation 
of a foreign language. However, by applying a more deferential standard of review on 
appeal for unpreserved errors, appellate courts hold the wrong actor responsible: the 
criminal defendant.  
2. A Deferential Standard 
There are cogent reasons why appellate courts typically show deference to trial 
courts’ evidentiary and factual determinations. Trial courts excel at assessing facts in 
addition to weighing and resolving evidentiary issues. However, these skills do not give 
the trial court an advantage when reviewing issues of misinterpretation, which are 
constitutional, legal issues. Therefore, deference is improper. Typically, appellate courts 
review evidentiary issues for abuse of discretion. “Abuse of discretion has been defined 
variously as ‘exceeding the bounds of reason or disregard of the rules or principles of law 
or practice . . . .’ ”59 Appellate courts apply this level of deference when the trial judge’s 
decision depended on “first-hand observations of the litigants and the evidence” or 
                                                 
53 See Guevara v. United States, 77 A.3d 412, 424 (D.C. 2013) (finding that where defendant does not 
object, the standard of review is elevated to clear error).  
54 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel where 
attorney’s “conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result.”). 
55 Id. 
56 Donald F. Roeschke, Annotation, Strategies for Enforcing the Right to Effective Representation, 46 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS 571, § 4.5 (2018). 
57 Sarno, supra note 50. 
58 See, e.g., People v. Ramos, 920 N.E.2d 504, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); People v. Costales, 520 N.E.2d 
421, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (affirming trial court’s finding that defendant did not need an interpreter and 
therefore denying defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on interpreter’s errors). 
59 7 Wayne R. LaFave et. al., Annotation, Criminal Procedure, 7 Crim. Proc. § 27.5(e) (4th ed. 2017) 
(quoting State v. Adams, 879 P.2d 513, 516 (Haw. 1994)).  
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involved “issues about which the trial judge has a greater understanding than an appellate 
judge.”60 As will be discussed, misinterpretation is not this type of issue. 
When attorneys do not object to translation deficiencies, some appellate courts 
elevate their deference to plain error.61 Applying this standard, “an appellate court can 
correct an error not raised at trial only if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that 
‘affects substantial rights,’ and (4) ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ”62 When a defendant appeals an unpreserved issue, 
appellate courts’ reluctance to overturn the trial court’s decision “may well surpass 
whatever caution an appellate judge would exercise before overturning a lower court 
decision reviewed for abuse of discretion.”63 Reviewing claims of interpreter 
mistranslation for plain error improperly penalizes criminal defendants for their 
attorneys’ limited foreign language skills and permits the infringement of key 
constitutional rights. Therefore, appellate courts’ deference is again improper. 
Although errors in translation occur during the trial, often they are not immediately 
recognized. Appellate courts assume that since trial judges hear witness testimony, as 
opposed to reading a transcript, they can better identify mistranslations. This erroneous 
conclusion likely stems from the deference accorded to “trial court findings regarding 
credibility . . . .”64 With regard to credibility, appellate courts give deference “because the 
trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a witness’s demeanor and tone of voice as 
well as other mannerisms that bear heavily on one’s belief in what the witness says.”65 
Critically, however, the skills needed to assess credibility are not the same as those 
required to identify errors in interpretation. Missing this distinction, appellate courts 
assume that when an interpreter mistranslates, there is some outward manifestation of 
that error—perhaps a hiccup in the flow of interpretation or demonstrated confusion by 
the witness, attorney, or interpreter. Because of this assumption, appellate courts afford 
substantial deference to trial judges’ evidentiary determinations which includes 
interpreted witness testimony. However, the trial judge has no clear advantage over an 
appellate court in identifying, examining, and remedying errors in interpretation. In fact, 
when an interpreter is used “[i]t is almost impossible for a trial judge to tell whether an 
interpretation is accurate unless the judge is bilingual and can monitor the interpreter’s 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 397 F. App'x 583, 586 (11th Cir. 2010) (reviewing claimed error in 
interpretation for plain error since defendant failed to object at trial); United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 
1324, 1340–43 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that the trial court did not err in failing to appoint an interpreter 
and where the issue is not preserved by contemporaneous objection the proper standard of review is plain 
error); People v. Molina, 418 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (demonstrating that a claim of 
misinterpretation is waived if defendant fails to object unless it constitutes plain error); see also Jonathan S. 
Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 678 (2015) (“[W]hen the 
appealing party has failed to raise and preserve the issue at trial, all these types of questions are reviewed 
only for plain error, a[] . . .  more deferential standard.”); Turner, supra note 46, at 142 (“When criminal 
defendants fail to object to inadequate interpretation at trial, reviewing courts will apply the plain error 
standard of review.”). 
62 LaFave et. al., supra note 59, § 27.5(d) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 462 (1997)). 
63 Masur & Ouellette, supra note 61, at 680. 
64 United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 634 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
65 Id. (quoting Donato, 96 F.3d at 634). 
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performance.”66 Even if the judge happens to speak or understand the witness’s non-
English testimony, the “bilingual judge, although well intentioned, is not competent to 
determine an interpreter’s abilities.”67 
To identify misinterpretations, a comparison between what the defendant actually 
said and the interpreter’s English translation of that word or phrase is necessary. The trial 
court has no clear advantage in performing this comparison. However, an appellate court, 
reviewing a full record, could determine whether the error occurred and whether it was 
significant enough to impinge on constitutional rights. 
B. Errors Are Not Preserved for Review 
In addition to appellate courts’ improper classification of these errors as evidentiary 
issues, another significant deficiency in courts’ treatment of interpreted testimony is 
procedural: errors in interpretation do not appear on the record and therefore are not 
preserved for an appeal.68 As noted, the evidence in a trial is the English-translated 
testimony provided by the interpreter.69 In fact, juries are instructed to disregard non-
English testimony, even if they can understand it.70 The LEP defendant or LEP witness’s 
own testimony is not preserved by the court; it is not captured by the court reporter, and it 
is not typically recorded by the court.71 Therefore, when a criminal defendant claims an 
error was made and wishes to point to the error in the trial transcript, he or she cannot.  
As noted by the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Tamayo, a case where a 
defendant brought a post-conviction claim for deficient translation, there was no evidence 
on the record to support or refute the defendant’s claim of mistranslation.72 The Tamayo 
court determined that an evidentiary hearing on this issue was warranted because all that 
could be ascertained from the record was the presence of an interpreter, with no 
information about the quality or sufficiency of the translation.73 While the Tamayo 
court’s response is insufficient to guard LEP defendants’ rights, particularly because the 
burden is on the defendant to make a “substantial showing that his constitutional rights 
ha[d]been violated,” the court’s recognition of the trial record’s insufficiency is 
noteworthy.74 
                                                 
66 Debra L. Hovland, Errors in Interpretation: Why Plain Error Is Not Plain, 11 LAW & INEQ. 473, 479 
(1993). 
67 Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 46, at 298. 
68 United States v. Villa-Gomez, 400 F. App'x 104, 105 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A claim of interpreter 
mistranslation] necessarily would be frivolous if made on direct appeal because there is no record support 
for it”) (citing United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cirrincione, 
780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
69 NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.19 (NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMM. 2010) (instructing jury to rely only on English interpretation of testimony and disregard non-
English testimony even if they understood it); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 379 (1991) (stating 
that jurors must accept official translation of testimony provided by court interpreter even if they 
understand non-English testimony). 
70 NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.19. 
71 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(2) (2012) (noting that a sound recording of a judicial proceeding is 
available only on motion of a party and with the judge’s consent); see also Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 
46, at 294 (“The court reporter does not maintain a record of non-English testimony.”).  
72 People v. Tamayo, No. 3-14-0368, 2016 WL 6603592, ¶ 24 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 8, 2016). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at ¶ 15. 
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Significantly, because mistranslations are not “record errors,” meaning, errors that 
appear on the record forwarded for appellate review, they cannot be argued on direct 
appeal.75 Since the criminal defendant cannot raise this issue on direct appeal, he or she is 
left to raise it on collateral review.76 Collateral review “means a judicial reexamination of 
a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process.”77 On collateral 
review defendants may bring the appellate court’s attention to errors not captured by the 
trial record.78 But, relegating appeals of mistranslation to collateral review is problematic 
because at this stage of the post-conviction proceedings, the defendant is not 
constitutionally guaranteed the right to an attorney.79 Moreover, in the federal context, 
the criminal defendant also bears the heavy burden of proving the “error ‘had [a] 
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict,’ ” rather 
than whether it “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”80  
Forcing an LEP defendant to argue the issue of mistranslation on collateral review 
is fundamentally improper because it penalizes the criminal defendant for the error of a 
court-appointed interpreter—an individual who is compensated by the state or federal 
government. By limiting the defendant’s opportunity to appeal this issue and therefore 
severely restricting the availability of assistance by appointed counsel, the criminal 
defendant is held responsible for the interpretation error. Paradoxically, the criminal 
defendant is penalized for an error precipitated by a government-paid interpreter that, by 
the court’s own admission, the defendant was substantially incapable of recognizing.  
III. THE PROBLEMS IN CONTEXT 
The federal courts and state court systems in California, Illinois and Texas are 
overwhelmingly predisposed to find misinterpretation harmless error;81 however, these 
jurisdictions vary on the standard of review applied and whether the error is treated as 
legal or factual.82 Some federal circuits, like the Seventh, treat the error as constitutional 
and review it de novo.83 Others, like Texas state courts, treat errors in interpretation as 
categorically factual and apply an abuse of discretion standard.84 All jurisdictions 
examined require contemporaneous and specific objections to errors in translation in 
                                                 
75 See Helen A. Anderson, Revising Harmless Error: Making Innocence Relevant to Direct Appeals, 17 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 391, 391 (2011) (“On direct appeal, courts will look at claims of trial error, and 
evaluate those claims and their ‘harmlessness’ based only on the trial record.”). 
76 Id. 
77 Brian R. Means, Annotation, Federal Habeas Manual, FED. HABEAS MANUAL § 9A:74 (2018) (citing 
Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 553 (2011)). 
78 Anderson, supra note 75, at 399–400 (challenges involving evidence outside the trial record have to be 
brought on collateral review). 
79 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). 
80 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 
(1946) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  
81 Turner, supra note 46, at 141. 
82 See, e.g., United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2016) (treating accuracy of interpretation as 
an issue of law); Lee v. State, No. 05-02-01119-CR, 2003 WL 21142887, at *2 (Tex. App. May 19, 2003) 
(treating accuracy of interpreter translation as an issue of fact).  
83 Leiva, 821 F.3d at 811. 
84 Gonzalez v. State, 752 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App. 1988).  
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order to preserve them for appeal; however, some impute this requirement to the criminal 
defendant85 and others refuse to waive the objection requirement even when the 
interpreter admits to the error.86 Several courts, including those in California and Illinois, 
focus on the LEP defendant’s need for interpretation rather than on the errors of 
interpretation,87 and other jurisdictions consider interpretation as an undeserved 
advantage.88 All these variations impact the ability of an LEP criminal defendant to 
receive relief from the damage inflicted by interpreters’ errors; many of these variations 
essentially prevent defendants from redressing deprivations of their constitutional rights. 
A. Interpretation Errors in Federal Courts 
As discussed earlier, federal appellate courts’ treatment of appeals based on 
interpreter error is inconsistent both in categorization and review. Some circuits view 
claims of interpreter error as constitutional and review them de novo while others treat 
these errors as evidentiary and apply a deferential standard of review. Federal courts’ 
inconstant treatment of these errors appears irreconcilable when interpretation in criminal 
cases is contrasted against review of interpretation errors in deportation proceedings. 
Despite the fact that deportees have fewer constitutional rights than criminal defendants, 
deportees benefit from an easier path to redressing these errors. While all jurisdictions 
examined require criminal defendants to object contemporaneously to errors in 
interpretation, the issue is considered preserved when deportees offer other evidence of 
interpretation issues, including non-responsive answers. Holding LEP criminal 
defendants to a higher standard requires them to identify mistranslations in a language the 
court acknowledges they do not understand. When these defendants, understandably, fall 
                                                 
85 See Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1165–66 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding it significant that 
defendant did not object to the adequacy of interpretation at trial and noting courts treat this “as a factor 
weighing against a finding of abuse of discretion . . . .”); United States v. Hernandez, 994 F. Supp. 627, 630 
(E.D. Pa. 1998), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding defendant waived the issue of 
misinterpretation by failing to object during trial, despite recognizing the role of the interpreter in helping 
the defendant understand the proceedings); People v. Harris, 433 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) 
(concluding defendant is barred from claiming interpretation error since he did not object during trial); Kan 
v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 43 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding defendant waived issue of interpretation error by 
failing to raise it during trial) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
86 See, e.g., People v. Koch, 618 N.E.2d 647, 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (although interpreter admitted to 
misinterpreting testimony and defendant claimed these errors damaged his credibility with the jury, the 
court held misinterpretations were immaterial and therefore did not warrant reversal of defendant’s 
conviction).  
87 See, e.g., People v. Sokau, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (despite defendant’s 
expression of need and the court’s acknowledgement that the trial was a credibility contest, it concluded the 
defendant spoke and understood sufficient English to make any interpreter errors superfluous); People v. 
Clark, 12 N.E.3d 708, 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (finding defendant altogether incredible because she 
requested an interpreter despite working a job the court assumed required “a working knowledge of 
English”). 
88 See e.g., People v. Partida, 122 P.3d 765, 768 (Cal. 2005) (demonstrating that the objection requirement 
prevents the defendant from purposefully failing to object to interpretation at trial and “gambl[ing] on an 
acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal”); Gonzalez v. 
United States, 697 A.2d 819, 823 (D.C. 1997) (“To allow a defendant to remain silent throughout the trial 
and then, upon being found guilty, to assert a claim of inadequate translation would be an open invitation to 
abuse.” (quoting Redman v. United States, 616 A.2d 336, 338 D.C.1992)). 
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short of this standard, their chance for success on appeal dwindles and their constitutional 
rights are compromised. 
1. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Leiva reviewed an appeal from a conviction 
for conspiracy to possess and use counterfeit credit cards.89 Defense counsel objected to 
the use of one of the interpreters, noting the interpreter was summarizing the defendant’s 
testimony and did not seem to be providing real time translation.90 According to the trial 
transcript, the interpreter fumbled with defendant’s testimony several times, 
demonstrating clear confusion.91 Both the trial judge and the attorneys recognized the 
translation problems stemmed from the interpreter’s lack of familiarity with the 
defendant’s Cuban dialect.92 After the defendant himself expressed difficulty with the 
interpreter, his counsel made a motion to have the proceedings audio recorded as per 
provision § 1827(d)(2) of the Court Interpreter’s Act.93 At the close of trial, the defendant 
was sentenced to 60–82 months in prison, as well as two years of supervised release.94  
The Leiva court first analyzed the defendant’s constitutional claim and then his 
statutory claim under the Court Interpreter’s Act.95 The Court confirmed that the 
defendant had “a constitutional right to competent translation of his testimony at trial” 
and a due process right to testify on his behalf.96 If a criminal defendant is “unable to 
understand the proceedings due to a language difficulty,” his due process right is also 
infringed.97 Distinguishing between claims of improper translation and improper function 
of the court interpreter, the Seventh Circuit wrote “the due process claim focuses on the 
translation itself; the [Court Interpreter Act] claim focuses on the court's actions or 
omissions regarding the interpreter and her ability to translate.”98 
The Court unequivocally held that the defendant’s constitutional claims deserved 
de novo review.99 However, it held that deference was due to the district court in its 
application of the statutory provision.100 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the trial 
court’s unwillingness to replace the problematic interpreter for abuse of discretion, but 
reviewed the constitutional issue de novo.101 Ultimately, the Court held that due process 
is denied where “the accuracy and scope of a translation at a hearing or trial is subject to 
grave doubt.”102 While the Leiva court concluded that the error was harmless since it did 
not render the trial fundamentally unfair, the Seventh Circuit’s application of de novo 
                                                 
89 United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2016). 
90 Id. at 814. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 816. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 816–17. 
95 Id. at 819.  
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 819 (quoting Mendoza v. United States, 755 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 2014)). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
100 Id. at 819–20. 
101 Id. at 819. 
102 Id. at 820 (citing United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 634 (1985)).  
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review is instructive, as is its choice to bifurcate the inquiry.103 In contrast to state courts, 
particularly those in Texas that insist errors in translation are issues of fact, the Leiva 
court readily recognized the claimed error was constitutional. 
Although federal courts rarely find constitutional rights are violated by an 
interpreter’s poor performance, the Seventh Circuit has recognized numerous ways in 
which due process could be denied by deficient translation. In United States v. 
Cirrincione the Seventh Circuit enumerated the harms, holding that a  
 
defendant in a criminal proceeding is denied due process when: (1) what is 
told him is incomprehensible; (2) the accuracy and scope of a translation 
at a hearing or trial is subject to grave doubt; (3) the nature of the 
proceeding is not explained to him in a manner designed to insure [sic] his 
full comprehension; or (4) a credible claim of incapacity to understand due 
to language difficulty is made and the district court fails to review the 
evidence and make appropriate findings of fact.104  
 
While the Seventh Circuit outpaces other courts by acknowledging that deficient 
translation can implicate constitutional rights, a recurring issue is accommodating an LEP 
defendant’s constitutional right to communicate with his or her attorney when LEP 
witnesses take the stand. In United States v. Johnson, the interpreter translating the 
proceedings for the defendant was also called upon to translate the testimony of LEP 
witnesses.105 Defense counsel proposed taking breaks during examination of these 
witnesses so he could communicate, through the interpreter, with the defendant.106 On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit held this was not an abuse of discretion because defense 
counsel devised the solution, and the trial court merely agreed to it.107 
This case is in stark contrast to a line of California appellate court cases discussed 
below, including People v. Carreon, which unequivocally denounced this practice as 
denying a defendant’s confrontation clause right.108 California courts imply that nothing 
short of an interpreter at the shoulder of the defendant during the entire trial will satisfy 
this constitutional guarantee.109 The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected this contention, 
holding “a defendant does not have a due process right to have an interpreter 
continuously seated at the defense table.”110 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Johnson is additionally troubling because it 
absolves the trial judge of any responsibility for the fairness of the proceedings.111 The 
law is clear, however, that the judge—not counsel—is ultimately responsible for the 
                                                 
103 Id.  
104 Cirrincione, 780 F.2d at 634. 
105 United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2001). 
106 Id. at 660. 
107 Id. at 661, 663. 
108 People v. Carreon, 151 Cal. App. 3d 559, 573 (1984). 
109 Id. 
110 Mendoza v. United States, 755 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson, 248 F.3d at 664)). 
111 Johnson, 248 F.3d at 661. 
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fairness of proceedings.112 As noted by the court in People v. Romero, just because 
parties stipulate to a certain function of the interpreter does not mean that the judge does 
not commit reversible error by permitting it.113 
2. Other Federal Courts 
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s acceptance of the constitutional implications of 
errors in interpretation, most federal courts treat these errors as evidentiary issues and 
consequently fail to assure defendants’ constitutional rights. A prototypical example is 
the Eleventh Circuit’s response in United States v. Joshi.114 The Joshi court, like most 
others, demanded contemporaneous objections to interpretation in order to preserve 
errors for appeal.115 However, aggravating the problem, the Joshi court disregarded 
inquiries about the quality of translation made by the prosecutor and trial judge, 
implicitly concluding that a claim of mistranslation is only credible if noted by the 
defense.116 Assessing the trial court’s instruction that the interpreter use word-for-word 
interpretation as a “scrupulous effort . . . to insure [sic] that Joshi was receiving adequate 
translation,” the Eleventh Circuit held Joshi was not denied due process.117 
While most federal courts have not consistently recognized that interpreters’ 
mistranslations can impinge constitutional rights, unexpectedly, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized this exact principle in deportation proceedings, where constitutional 
protections are more limited.118 Claims of deficient interpretation arise in the deportation 
context because non-citizens are assured due process.119 In Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., the 
Ninth Circuit recognized that, since individuals facing deportation have a right to 
interpretation and translation services, “an incorrect or incomplete translation is the 
functional equivalent of no translation.”120 Although most courts do not extend this 
comparison to criminal cases, it is readily applicable. Interpretation errors are the same, 
whether they occur in a criminal case or deportation proceeding. They are born out of the 
same courtroom pressures and language differences, and the consequences for criminal 
defendants are arguably more severe. Therefore, interpretation errors in criminal cases 
should be treated with the same gravity as they were by the Perez-Lastor court. Within 
the immigration context, the Ninth Circuit recognized three different manifestations of 
error that indicate incompetent translation: “First, direct evidence of incorrectly translated 
words . . . . Second, unresponsive answers by the witness . . . . [And] third[,] . . . the 
witness's expression of difficulty understanding what is said to him.”121 While these 
factors should apply in the criminal context, numerous federal courts ignore multiple 
                                                 
112 See Johnson v. Hill, 274 F.2d 110, 116 (8th Cir. 1960) (“The trial judge, in the first instance, has the 
responsibility and duty to so supervise and conduct litigation proceedings as to afford all parties a fair and 
impartial trial to the end that justice is served.”). 
113 People v. Romero, 187 P.3d 56, 73 (Cal. 2008). 
114 United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 1990). 
115 Id. (citing Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
116 Id.  
117 Id. 
118 Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. (citations omitted). 
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indicia of improper translation and recognize only the third manifestation: the LEP 
defendant’s own expression of difficultly with the interpretation.  
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is one of the courts that 
only credits the third indication of mistranslation.122 Denying defendant’s motion for a 
new trial in a drug possession case, the court in United States v. Hernandez relied heavily 
on the fact that the defendant herself did not object to the translation and therefore 
considered the matter waived.123 In this way, the District Court, and the Third Circuit, 
affirming the District Court without opinion, approved of this imputation of objection 
from attorney to defendant.124 The Hernandez court, citing to Valladares v. United States, 
adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that unless the defendant makes difficulties with 
the interpreter known, the right to appeal on the basis of inadequate interpretation should 
be waived, as to prevent abuse of appellate courts.125  
The significant error in the district court’s opinion is that it disregarded the 
possibility that the actions of the interpreter could render the trial fundamentally unfair 
without causing confusion discernable to the defendant or others present. Instead, the 
court emphasized that because no confusion resulted from the interpreter’s multiple 
mistranslations, the trial was not unfair.126 However, mistranslations can be both 
significant and subtle, without recognizable confusion but with significant impact on the 
trier of fact. The Eleventh Circuit, as well as state courts in California and Illinois, have 
all fallen into this trap. In United States v. Santos, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an 
instance where an interpreter mistranslated “medical assistant” as “physician’s assistant” 
in a case about Medicare fraud.127 The interpreter admitted to mistranslation during the 
trial, but the district court did not permit the defendant to call another interpreter.128 
Instead the parties stipulated to the corrected testimony and the jury was instructed 
accordingly.129 Although the Court acknowledged that the district court likely erred, it 
found there was no abuse of discretion because the error was harmless.130 While Santos 
involved a trial judge’s decision regarding permissible evidence, and thus had a more 
evidentiary than constitutional basis, the judge’s decision to exclude this evidence was 
problematic; the mistranslation could have given the jury a false impression about the 
veracity of the defendant even though the stipulation corrected the record.131  
                                                 
122 United States v. Hernandez, 994 F. Supp. 627, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000). 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. (citing Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565–66 (11th Cir. 1989)). The assertion that the 
objection requirement is necessary to prevent abuse of the courts will be discussed at greater length in Part 
IV of this Note since, upon closer look, it is clear in this context that purposeful failure to object could not 
be part of a viable trial strategy. 
126 Id. at 629. 
127 United States v. Santos, 397 F. App'x 583, 588 (11th Cir. 2010). 
128 Id.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 However, in comparison to the Sokau and Clark decisions discussed later in this Comment, this situation 
is not quite as egregious. In Santos, at least a stipulation was submitted to the jury to correct the 
misinterpretations. Although it is possible that jurors disregarded the stipulation and were influenced by the 
mistranslation, we must assume that the jury abides by the instructions of the trial judge in performing its 
duty. United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1472 (11th Cir. 1996).  
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As a decision in the Sixth Circuit demonstrates, defendants are unlikely to be 
successful when appealing a trial court’s denial of their motion to record the non-English 
testimony, particularly when the court is applying a plain error standard. The defense 
attorney in United States v. Gonzales argued before the Sixth Circuit that the trial court 
should have recorded translated testimony presented at trial.132 The attorney argued that 
the district court erred by not, sua sponte, recording the testimony of the Spanish-
speaking interpreter.133 Because of this alleged error, Gonzales contended that “a post-
trial review of the entire record [could not] be made to check for potential errors, thus 
violating [his] right to a fair trial and due process.”134 The Court, applying a plain error 
standard, dismissed this argument as meritless, pointing to the clear statutory language of 
the Court Interpreter Act.135 The Act is unambiguous—the District Court may decide to 
record the proceedings when a motion is made by a party. Disposing of the defense 
attorney’s argument, the Court noted the defendant had not formally moved for recording 
during the trial and thus the argument was “belated” and unsupported by any contention 
of error, “plain or otherwise.”136 However, the Sixth Circuit did admit that Gonzales’s 
argument for recording translated testimony was alluring from a public policy 
perspective.137  
These decisions reflect federal courts’ inconsistent categorization and treatment of 
errors in interpretation. Cases from the Seventh Circuit suggest a willingness to treat 
these errors as constitutional and perform de novo review.138 However, the vast majority 
of circuit courts treat errors in interpretation as evidentiary and therefore limit LEP 
defendants’ chances for the error to be rectified.139 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s 
recognition that deficient interpretation is equivalent to no interpretation, and therefore 
implicates defendants’ right to due process, this reasoning has not been extended to the 
criminal context.140 Furthermore, in criminal cases, federal courts only accept the LEP 
defendant’s expression of difficulty with the interpretation as evidence of 
misinterpretation.141 This standard illogically requires a defendant, whom the court has 
found cannot speak or understand English, to monitor and raise issues with English 
translation. These requirements have a devastating impact on an LEP defendant’s chances 
to redress his or her constitutional rights. 
 
 
                                                 
132 United States v. Gonzales, 179 F. App'x 362, 363 (6th Cir. 2006). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 364. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 365. 
137 Id.  
138 See United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2016) (reviewing the trial court’s application of 
Court Interpreter Act for abuse of discretion but the misinterpretation de novo).  
139 See, e.g., United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 1990) (requiring contemporaneous 
objection to preserve errors of interpretation as is necessary to preserve other evidentiary errors).  
140 Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 994 F. Supp. 627, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (finding that the issue of misinterpretation was waived because defendant did not make an 
objection during trial). 
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B. Interpretation Errors in State Courts 
Although federal courts do not uniformly acknowledge the constitutional harms 
resulting from interpreter mistranslation, California, Illinois and Texas state courts are 
even more predisposed to treat interpreter error as evidentiary. Because of this, these state 
courts rigorously require objections to preserve the issue and apply a clear error or abuse 
of discretion standard on review, limiting LEP criminal defendants’ chances of success. 
Some courts restrict LEP defendants’ chances even further by requiring that they identify 
the mistranslation in the record, despite the fact that there is typically no record of non-
English testimony. Lastly, LEP defendants bringing their claims in state court face the 
risk that the appellate court will skeptically assess whether they truly required interpreter 
services. If the court concludes they misrepresented their need, the use of the interpreter 
may actually damage the LEP defendants’ overall credibility and doom their appeal.   
1. California State Court 
Like other jurisdictions examined, California courts demand specific and 
contemporaneous objections in order to preserve claims of inaccurate translation for 
appellate review.142 One of the more extreme examples of this is People v. Aguirre.143 
Three interpreters were present at the trial for battery and serious bodily injury that 
occurred during a soccer match.144 While one interpreter was translating a witness’s 
testimony, the two other interpreters noticed an error.145 They alerted defense counsel to 
the interpreter’s failure to translate the witness’s statement that the victim had picked up 
dirt just prior to the altercation.146 This evidence would have supported the defendant’s 
theory of the victim’s aggressive tendency.147 However, the defense attorney did not 
immediately make an objection.148 He later claimed that because of his limited Spanish 
language proficiency, he did not initially understand the significance of what the 
interpreters told him.149 When the attorney objected later in the trial, the court refused to 
correct the error because it was not raised immediately.150 On appeal, the reviewing court 
affirmed Aguirre’s conviction.151  
Similar to Aguirre, the court in People v. Sokau stringently required formal 
objections to the quality of interpretation.152 In Sokau, the California appellate court 
                                                 
142 See People v. Partida, 122 P.3d 765, 768 (Cal. 2005) (interpreting California Evidence Code § 353 and 
holding that “[i]n accordance with this statute, we have consistently held that the ‘defendant's failure to 
make a timely and specific objection’ on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable”) 
(quoting People v. Seijas, 114 P.3d 742, 749 (Cal. 2005)). 
143 People v. Aguirre, No. B231368, 2012 WL 3332366 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2012). 
144 Id. at *4. 
145 Id. at *1. 
146 Id. at *4. 
147 Id. at *3. 
148 Id. at *4. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at *3. 
151 Id. at *1. 
152 People v. Sokau, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015), review denied (Oct. 14, 2015). 
Interestingly, an overwhelming number of cases reviewing errors in interpretation are designated as 
unpublished or uncitable by courts, particularly in California. 
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affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, holding the 
defendant waived the issue of interpretation error because defense counsel failed to make 
a formal objection to the interpretation.153 The court reached this conclusion despite 
counsel’s request for the court to instruct the interpreter to translate in the first person and 
the interpreter’s subsequent violation of the court’s order several dozen times.154 
Reviewing the record, the majority concluded that despite the defendant’s request for an 
interpreter, he was sufficiently fluent in English such that the interpreter’s errors could 
not have unfairly affected his trial.155 Drawing a bright line, the court held that unless 
counsel formally objects to the translation, the issue is waived, and to decide otherwise 
would permit defense counsel to engage in gamesmanship.156 Reading between the lines, 
this statement reveals the court’s belief that defense counsel may decline to immediately 
object as part of a trial strategy. The baselessness of this concern will be addressed in Part 
IV of this Comment. 
While the Sokau majority recognized the numerous errors in translation, most 
notably, the interpreter’s failure to translate in first person, it concluded “[n]othing of 
substance was lost in the translation and appellant's defense was conveyed to the jury.”157 
Troublingly, the majority reached this conclusion while admitting that the trial was a 
credibility contest, thereby ignoring the likelihood that the interpreter’s deficient 
translation impacted the jury’s assessment of the defendant’s credibility.158 Even further, 
the majority seemed to treat the use of an interpreter as a leg-up for the defendant rather 
than a mechanism for placing an LEP defendant on equal footing with a native-English 
speaker. Because the majority speculated that the trial court and prosecutor made 
reasonable inferences that the defendant was actually conversant in English, it discounted 
the importance of the defendant’s own request for an interpreter and implied expression 
of his own comfort and proficiency in English.  
The dissent highlighted these problems with the majority’s reasoning, including its 
focus on the defendant’s English proficiency rather than the interpreter’s numerous 
mistranslations.159 The dissent also emphasized the potential damage of the interpreter’s 
confusing testimony, specifically because credibility was critical in this trial.160 In 
particular, it noted that when the interpreter erroneously testified in the third person 
during the prosecution’s attempted impeachment, it “may have caused jurors to 
incorrectly conclude [the defendant] had given inconsistent testimony.”161 While the 
dissent maintained that some manner of objection was still required to preserve this issue 
for appellate review, it concluded defense counsel more than met this requirement by 
bringing the issue to the trial court’s attention, particularly considering the trial judge’s 
many on-record admonishments of the interpreter.162 
                                                 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 860. 
155 Id. at 861. 
156 Id. at 860. 
157 Id. at 861. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 862 (Gilbert, P.J., dissenting). 
160 Id. at 870. 
161 Id. at 865. 
162 Id. at 868. 
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Like the Seventh Circuit in Johnson, a handful of California appellate courts also 
tackled the issue of whether an interpreter’s performance may violate a defendant’s 
confrontation clause right. However, in contrast to the Seventh Circuit, California 
appellate courts found reversible error when the defendant’s interpreter was also used by 
the court for witness examination.163 For example, the court in People v. Carreon 
denounced this practice because using the interpreter to translate for witnesses left the 
defendant without an interpreter during some of the accuser’s most damaging 
testimony.164 The court held this error impacted the defendant’s constitutional rights 
because the defendant was “effectively precluded from ever having the benefit of a 
defense interpreter during the examination of the witness who delivered the most crucial 
and devastating evidence against him.”165 Examining other California appellate court 
decisions, along with cases from the Fifth Circuit and United States Supreme Court, the 
Carreon court held “denial of interpreter services impairs not only the defendant's due 
process rights, but also his rights to confront adverse witnesses, to the effective assistance 
of counsel, and to be present at his own trial.”166 The court further held that implied 
waiver of the right to an interpreter was impossible under these circumstances, since “a 
withdrawal of the services of the interpreter . . . would be so potentially harmful . . . .”167  
Despite California courts’ recognition that interpreters protect LEP defendants’ 
confrontation clause right, this error is only reversible “where it appears to have 
materially affected the regularity of the accused’s trial and conviction.”168 In contrast to 
the challenge LEP defendants face in alleging interpretation errors, it is not as difficult 
for LEP defendants denied interpreter services to prove material impact. They can simply 
point to the English record of the witness’s interpreted testimony and argue their inability 
to understand that testimony, and therefore participate in their defense, was significant.  
All that is required is “informed speculation that . . . [his or her] right to effective 
representation was denied . . . .”169 
2. Illinois State Court 
Like California courts, Illinois state courts fall into two familiar traps: first, failing 
to recognize that even if mistranslations do not confuse the fact finder, they may impact 
their assessment of the defendant’s credibility, and second, critically examining the 
defendant’s need for interpretive services under the implicit assumption that an 
interpreter provides an undeserved leg-up for defendants.  
People v. Clark illustrates both pitfalls.170 In Clark, an Illinois appellate court 
reviewed defendant’s claim that “the court-appointed interpreter deprived her of a fair 
trial, due process, and her fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.”171 Despite 
being convicted in a bench trial, the defendant claimed the “judge became frustrated with 
                                                 
163 See, e.g., People v. Carreon, 151 Cal. App. 3d 559, 576 (1984). 
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 567 (citations omitted). 
167 Id. at 573. 
168 Id. at 574 (citations omitted). 
169 Id. at 575. 
170 People v. Clark, 12 N.E.3d 708, 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
171 Id. at 714. 
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the interpreter” who made several interpretation errors, including summarizing testimony, 
which made the defendant appear less credible and resulted in her conviction.172 The 
appellate court held the defendant waived her right to claim this error because she failed 
to object at trial or raise the issue in a post-trial motion.173  
Straying from the subject of the appeal—whether the interpreter mistranslated 
testimony—the appellate court probed, at length, into whether the defendant actually 
needed the assistance of a court interpreter. In light of defendant’s occupation—a 
receptionist—a profession which the Clark court assumed required English proficiency, 
and her conversations with the interpreter concerning the translations, the trial court 
“found [the defendant’s] credibility was placed in doubt by her assertion that she could 
not speak English well enough to testify in court without an interpreter.”174 The trial court 
weighed this evidence of the defendant’s need for an interpreter against her request for an 
interpreter and concluded she was not a credible witness.175  Therefore, Clark’s use of an 
interpreter had a negative, not positive, impact on the trier of fact’s assessment of her 
case. 
Like the majority in People v. Sokau,176 the Clark court relied upon an unsupported 
contention that an interpreter provides a defendant with a competitive advantage in 
court.177 The veracity of this assumption is refuted in theory and practice. From a 
practical perspective, the Clark and Sokau courts’ prejudice demonstrate the risk of using 
an interpreter.178 Even assuming a prejudice-free fact finder, experts believe credibility is 
assessed in numerous ways beyond simply what a witness says.179 In fact, courts agree 
that tone of voice and mannerisms impact credibility.180 “Vocal expressions contribute to 
perceptions about the witness . . . [and] include[] phrasing, pausing, and interruptions.”181 
All of these vocal expressions are difficult even for an extremely effective interpreter to 
mimic. The result is that some of the LEP defendant’s vocal expressions are literally lost 
in translation, or, even worse distorted and altered through the interpreter’s presentation.  
                                                 
172 Id. 
173 See id. (While Illinois appellate courts may review unpreserved claims of error for plain error, the 
appellate court found this issue waived because the defendant “failed to raise plain error on appeal . . . .”) 
(citing People v. Hillier, 237 Ill.2d 539, 545–46 (2010)). 
174 Id. at 715. 
175 See id. ("The trial court was able to assess [the defendant’s] demeanor on the witness stand, including 
her interactions with the interpreter, to determine her credibility.”). 
176 People v. Sokau, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
177 Clark, 12 N.E.3d at 715. 
178 See id. (finding the defendant unreliable, in part, because the court believed her request for an interpreter 
was undermined by evidence of her English proficiency); Sokau, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861 (despite 
numerous interpretation problems, including persistently translating in the third person, court found nothing 
of substance was lost and defendant may not have truly required interpretation services in the first place). 




180 United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he trial judge is in the best position to 
evaluate a witness's demeanor and tone of voice as well as other mannerisms that bear heavily on one's 
belief in what the witness says.”) (quoting Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 
623, 634 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
181 COHEN, supra note 179. 
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Another element of credibility lost in interpretation is the “[c]ongruence between 
verbal and nonverbal behavior.”182 This is the temporal connection between nonverbal 
perceptions like posture, gestures, facial expression and verbal perceptions such as voice, 
and expression.”183 The temporal relationship between verbal and nonverbal perceptions 
is severed when an interpreter is used. Posture and expressions emanate from the LEP 
witness, while verbal perceptions come from the interpreter. For example, if a LEP 
witness grimaced while saying a word or phrase the jury might miss the full meaning of 
this expression after it is interpreted into English. This demonstrates that rather than 
offering a competitive advantage, use of an interpreter is, at most, a crutch for an LEP 
defendant, and, at worst, a significant detriment to credibility. Despite the dearth of 
evidence that an interpreter offers any competitive advantage to an English-speaking 
defendant, California and Illinois courts persistently shift the rhetoric from errors in 
interpretation to need for interpretation. 
In another Illinois case, People v. Koch, the appellate court fell into a similar trap, 
ignoring the impact of interpreters on witness credibility and focusing narrowly on 
intelligibility of interpretation.184 The Koch court found “[a] defendant has no cause to 
complain where an interpreter's presentation of testimony is understandable, 
comprehensible and intelligible, and if it is not understandable, the unintelligibility of the 
translated testimony will warrant reversal only when it is rooted in the ineffectiveness of 
the interpreter.”185 While Koch alleged that errors committed by his Polish language 
interpreter “cast a negative light on his testimony, [and] thus damag[ed] his credibility 
before the trier of fact,” the appellate court disagreed, pointing to the substantial 
deference paid to trial courts’ determination in these matters.186  
Rather than recognizing that errors may go unnoticed or unrectified in the trial 
court, the Koch court affirmed the lower court, concluding that the assessment of the 
interpreter’s performance may depend on “factors such as inflection and emphasis . . . 
which cannot be adequately divined from the transcript . . . .”  Given that many of the 
factors that bear on interpreter competency are not preserved for review “[appellate 
courts] must be particularly averse to second-guess a trial court’s determination that an 
interpreter adequately translated the testimony . . . .”187 Ironically, in Koch, the interpreter 
admitted his own ineffectiveness, thereby affirming any problems with the testimony 
were attributable to the interpreter.188 However, the appellate court, finding all errors 
insignificant or immaterial, affirmed defendant’s conviction.189 
As the Koch case demonstrates, in Illinois courts, an interpreter’s admission of 
error is not necessarily sufficient to trigger appellate court review of mistranslation when 
the issue was not preserved by a contemporaneous objection. For example, in People v. 
Harris a defendant appealed his conviction, claiming “his right to confrontation was 
denied by virtue of the translator’s confessed paraphrasing of questions and answers 
                                                 
182 Id. at 5. 
183 Id. 
184 People v. Koch, 618 N.E.2d 647, 655 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
185 Id. (citations omitted). 
186 Id. at 654. 
187 Id. at 655. 
188 Id. at 654. 
189 Id. at 656–57. 
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during the complainant’s testimony.”190 The appellate court held that Harris was estopped 
from raising this claim because he did not object to the interpreter’s summary-style 
translation during the trial and “[t]here was no hint . . . [he] was dissatisfied with, or 
could not understand, the testimony being translated back.”191 Although Harris claimed 
the interpreter’s error was unnoted until the interpreter himself admitted it in chambers, 
the appellate court found this explanation unconvincing. Speculating on trial court 
proceedings, the appellate court held, “we believe it would have been obvious to even 
non-Spanish speaking persons that the interpreter and [the complainant] were engaged in 
conversation back and forth rather than question-answer dialogue.”192  
In Harris, the appellate court far exceeded its role in evaluating a record, 
particularly since it admitted the record did not reflect what questions were 
paraphrased.193 The court presumptively concluded that while the error was not visible on 
the record, it would have been obvious if it truly occurred. An appellate court simply has 
no basis to make that determination. Speculation on either the need for an interpreter or 
the function of the interpreter is beyond the proper role for appellate courts when LEP 
defendants’ testimony is not present on the record. 
Although all jurisdictions examined have a contemporaneous objection 
requirement, Illinois courts’ stance has particularly harsh consequences because it is 
imposed even when the interpreter admits his or her error. Illinois appellate courts also 
assume conflicting positions when reviewing interpreters’ performance. On one hand, 
they refuse to second-guess the trial court’s conclusion, recognizing that factors such as 
inflection and emphasis are absent from the record and prevent a complete and accurate 
review of the interpretation. However, on the other hand, Illinois courts assume that if the 
interpreter committed a damaging error, it would be identifiable through the trial court 
record. This illogical reasoning makes it particularly difficult for LEP defendants to 
succeed on appeal. This difficulty is compounded by Illinois courts’ failure to recognize 
that mistranslations may impact the jury’s assessment of the defendant’s credibility, even 
if the errors are corrected or involve collateral issues. Lastly, Illinois appellate courts are 
hesitant to reverse trial courts on this issue because of their subtle assumption that 
interpretation services provide a competitive advantage to defendants rather than merely 
positioning LEP defendants on equal footing with native English speakers. 
3. Texas State Court 
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit in Leiva, where the interpretation was reviewed 
as a legal issue,194 Texas appellate courts flip the inquiry and consider the “[c]ompetency 
of an interpreter [as] a question of law while the accuracy of an individual translation is a 
question of fact.”195 Then, courts review competency for abuse of discretion.196 As a 
result, Texas appellate courts refuse to entertain claims of inaccurate translation on direct 
                                                 
190 People v. Harris, 433 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
191 Id. at 347. 
192 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
193 Id. at 346. 
194 United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir. 2016).  
195 Lee v. State, No. 05-02-01119-CR, 2003 WL 21142887, at *2 (Tex. App. May 19, 2003) (citing Garcia 
v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1021 (1995)). 
196 Id.   
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appeal, do not acknowledge its constitutional underpinnings, and overwhelmingly find no 
abuse of discretion occurred.  
These problems appear in Qualls v. State, where the defendant appealed his capital 
conviction for murder and theft on twenty-one points of error, including inadequate 
interpretation.197 The court held the applicable standard “is whether the jury could have 
been misled by any discrepancies or improper translations.”198 The court affirmed Qualls’ 
conviction, concluding no “inaccuracies were presented which could have misled the 
jury” and the trial court did not abuse “its discretion by not appointing [another] 
interpreter.”199 Other courts, including the Seventh Circuit in Leiva,200 would apply 
different standards of review to those two alleged errors and review the alleged 
inaccuracies de novo; however, the Qualls court implied that both the trial court’s 
decision to not appoint a new interpreter and the resulting inaccurate interpretation are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.201 
Unlike the Pennsylvania district court in United States v. Hernandez,202 the Qualls 
court broadly assessed whether the jury could have been misled by the lapses in proper 
interpretation rather than whether the jury could be confused by errors in interpretation.203 
The former, more comprehensive inquiry appears designed to catch situations referenced 
earlier, where the jury was misguided by mistranslations but not confused by 
misinformation. However, even this improved analysis is too narrow because it ignores 
the possibility that misinterpretations had an outcome-determinative impact on the jury’s 
assessment of the defendant’s credibility.204 
The Qualls court’s analysis is not without faults, the most glaring of which was its 
decision to review errors in interpretation for abuse of discretion, even where the defense 
attorney made frequent objections.205 Compounding the risk of an unfair trial, there was 
no agreed-upon mechanism to record non-English testimony. In Qualls, the defense 
attorney, after objecting to mistranslation, requested the interpretation be recorded.206 
Although the trial court agreed, no action was taken by the court or counsel, and no 
recording was made.207  
Similar to Qualls, the Gonzalez v. State appellate court showed significant 
deference to the trial judge’s determination that the jury’s verdict was not misled by 
interpretation errors.208 The Gonzalez court reviewed the trial court’s decision not to 
                                                 
197 Qualls v. State, No. A14-92-01162-CR, 1994 WL 19609, at *7 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 1994) (Defendant 
contended that the interpreter mistranslated the testimony of a witness to the alleged theft. The interpreter 
translated the witness’s testimony as “[the victim] was quite upset because [the defendant] had robbed him 
or robbed something from him.” On appeal, defendant alleged that the interpreter added the reference to the 
robbery.). 
198 Id. (citing Vindel v. State, 537 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).  
199 Id. 
200 Leiva, 821 F.3d at 819. 
201 Qualls, 1994 WL 19609, at *7. 
202 United States v. Hernandez, 994 F. Supp. 627, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000). 
203 Qualls, 1994 WL 19609, at *7. 
204 See Gonzalez v. State, 752 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App. 1988).  
205 Qualls, 1994 WL 19609, at *7. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at *6. 
208 Gonzalez, 752 S.W.2d at 697. 
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appoint a new interpreter for abuse of discretion.209 However, the court extended the 
inquiry, reviewing whether “there [were] any inaccuracies or improper translations that 
could have misled the jury” for abuse of discretion as well.210 In this case, the defendant 
benefited from his bilingual attorney’s ability to monitor the interpreter’s translation and 
raise errors immediately.211 Unsurprisingly, the appellate court held that the jury was not 
misled because all claimed errors in interpretation were caught during the trial, and the 
jury was instructed on the correct translation.212  
Implicit in this holding is the court’s conclusion that unless the jury was misled, the 
trial could not have been fundamentally unfair. The court ignored the possibility that a 
jury could be influenced not just by what was said during the trial, but how it was said. 
The standard of review applied by the appellate court is particularly problematic because 
it conflates the issue of replacing the interpreter with the issue of the interpreter’s errors, 
reviewing them with equal deference. Declining to perform a thorough review of the 
implications of the interpreter’s errors, the court ignored the possibility that the numerous 
interpretation difficulties could have impacted the defendant’s perceived credibility and 
therefore the jury’s verdict. 
Like other jurisdictions examined, Texas courts require specific and timely 
objections.213 However, Texas courts also dismiss defendants’ appeals because of failure 
to point to specific evidence of mistranslation. Vindel v. State is example of this 
problem.214 There, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarily affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction because the record failed “to reflect any showing or claim of 
actual bias[,] . . . any claim to any specific inaccuracy[,]” or “an objection to the 
interpreter during the trial.”215 Incomprehensibly, appellate courts, including the Vindel 
court, do not explain how defendants can fulfill this requirement when trial courts fail to 
record non-English testimony, as occurred in Qualls v. State,216 and non-English 
testimony has not been preserved for review. 
Another significant problem, hinted at in Lee v. State, is Texas courts’ treatment of 
translation errors as factual rather than legal issues.217 As a result, appellate courts 
reflexively apply a deferential standard of review and decline to consider this claim of 
error on direct appeal. For example, the appellate court in Kan v. State rejected the 
defendant’s claim of inaccurate translation, concluding that “[t]he accuracy of the 
translation was a fact question properly addressed to the trial court. [An appellate court] 
                                                 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 698 (citations omitted). 
211 Id. at 699. 
212 Id. 
213 See TEX. R. APP. PROC. 33.1(a)(1) (providing that, in order to appeal, the trial court record must reflect a 
“timely request, objection, or motion”); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (providing that a party must timely object 
or move to strike evidence and state specific ground for doing so). 
214 Vindel v. State, 537 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).  
215 Id. 
216 Qualls v. State, No. A14-92-01162-CR, 1994 WL 19609, at *7 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 1994). 
217 See Lee v. State, No. 05-02-01119-CR, 2003 WL 21142887, at *2 (Tex. App. May 19, 2003) 
(“Competency of an interpreter is a question of law while the accuracy of an individual translation is a 
question of fact.”) (citing Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). 
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cannot review this issue because there is no legal issue presented; it is a factual question 
which ultimately only the jury can answer . . . .”218  
 The Kan court also considered this issue waived due to the defendant’s failure to 
allege inaccuracies in the trial court.219 The court did not recognize claims of error in 
interpretation as constitutional, and therefore, necessarily legal issues. Further, the 
appellate court was seemingly blind to the challenges of addressing misinterpretations 
during the trial. The reviewing court’s suggestion that a jury could determine sufficiency 
of translation appears outlandish when one recognizes that it is necessary for the reviewer 
of the translation to have extensive knowledge of the foreign language, which is 
impossible to guarantee with a jury.220 In contrast, however, if the error was preserved on 
the record, an appellate court could review it and, after being briefed by the parties, 
determine if the error implicated constitutional rights. 
In contrast to federal courts’ treatment of interpretation errors, particularly the 
Leiva court’s de novo review221 and the Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S. court’s recognition of the 
constitutional harms of deficient interpretation in the immigration contexts,222 state courts 
in California, Illinois and Texas are more likely to treat the error as an issue of fact and 
apply a deferential standard of review. While California courts provide the strongest 
protections of LEP defendants’ confrontation clause rights, requiring that an interpreter 
remain by the defendant’s side,223 California and Illinois courts frequently detour from 
reviewing the consequences of the interpreter’s error and conclude the LEP defendant did 
not truly require interpretive services.224 As evident through the Koch225 and Harris226 
cases, Illinois appellate courts maintain a strict objection requirement, even when the 
interpreter confesses his or her error. Texas courts take the most stringent view of this 
requirement, and demand defendants point to the specific interpretation error in the 
record, while not specifying how defendants could satisfy this requirement without a 
reliable mechanism to record non-English testimony.227 
IV. THE SOLUTION: RECORDING TESTIMONY TO PRESERVE FOR THE RECORD 
There are two ways in which appellate courts can modify their review of 
mistranslations and assure LEP criminal defendants’ constitutional rights. First, appellate 
courts should expand the record to include the non-English testimony of the defendant or 
witness testifying on his or her behalf. Second, appellate courts should treat errors in 
                                                 
218 Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 43 (Tex. App. 1999) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (citing Garcia, 
887 S.W.2d, at 875). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir. 2016). 
222 Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000). 
223 People v. Carreon, 151 Cal. App. 3d 559, 573 (1984). 
224 See, e.g., People v. Sokau, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (Gilbert, P.J., dissenting); 
People v. Clark, 12 N.E.3d 708, 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).  
225 People v. Koch, 618 N.E.2d 647, 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
226 People v. Harris, 433 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
227 See Vindel v. State, 537 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (finding no reversible error because 
the record did not show any specific inaccuracy in interpretation). 
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translation as constitutional errors and review them de novo to ascertain whether the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A. Expanding the Record to Include Non-English Testimony 
If the defendant’s testimony was included in the record, along with the interpreter’s 
English translation, the error would be a considered a record error and consequently 
reviewable on direct appeal. Errors in interpretation should be remedied on direct appeal 
rather than through post-conviction motions. This would permit criminal defendants to 
take advantage of their last opportunity for constitutionally-assured counsel.228 Further, 
raising this error on direct appeal places the burden on the government to prove the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.229 The government should be held to this 
Chapman standard230 because the interpretation error, entirely beyond the control of the 
defendant or counsel, has a potentially determinative impact on the jury’s conviction 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
One potential solution is for the trial court to record the proceedings in their 
entirety per section (d)(2) of the Court Interpreter Act.231 However, this measure would 
likely be insufficient because it is limited to federal cases and left to the discretion of the 
trial court. Further limiting the potential of this solution is the fact that appellate courts 
review district court’s failure to record proceedings for plain error, giving defendants 
little recourse.232 Notably, the statutory requirement that district courts be prepared to 
record the interpretation affirms that federal courtrooms are technologically equipped to 
do so. A modest change to the Court Interpreter Act would require all proceedings with 
interpreters to be recorded, protecting defendants’ constitutional rights, at least in federal 
cases.  
In state courts, another relatively simple change is necessary. Court reporters 
frequently record testimony to aid themselves in compiling a transcript of the trial.233 
When transcribing proceedings where interpreters are used, the court reporter could place 
a recording device near the defendant or witness to capture their testimony. 
Developments in technology make it easy and inexpensive for the court reporter to record 
the defendant’s non-English testimony in all cases where testimony is provided through 
an interpreter.234 This testimony would then be preserved for the record, even if it is not 
                                                 
228 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (defendants must have benefit of counsel during 
their only appeal as of right regardless of the merits).   
229 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
230 See id. (“[C]onstitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on 
someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless.”). 
231 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(2) (2012).   
232 See United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 572 F. App'x 790, 791 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding trial court did not 
plainly err by not recording Spanish testimony since there is no absolute requirement it do so).  
233 See Don Zupanec, Access to Court Reporter’s Backup Tapes, FED. LITIGATOR, Feb. 2008, at 14, 14. 
(noting that motions to compel production of court reporters’ backup tapes are usually denied; however, 
creation of backup tapes is routine practice). 
234 See Guidelines for Professional Practice, NAT’L COURT REPORTERS ASS’N, 
https://www.ncra.org/home/professionals_resources/NCRA-Code-of-Professional-Ethics/cope---
guidelines-for-professional-practice (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“The latest innovation involves 
technology that has been developed for computer-aided translation (CAT) software, which allows for the 
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considered evidence. The direct appeal lawyer could contrast the testimony of the 
defendant with the inaccurate translation and present the error on appeal. 
Comparison to defendants utilizing American Sign Language (ASL) is instructive 
here. In the California case, People v. Younghanz, a defendant claimed that the “failure to 
videotape the victim’s sign language testimony deprived him of a complete record for 
adequate consideration on appeal” and “right to a literal translation of a witness’s 
testimony.”235 The court agreed; however, it denied relief as they found Younghanz was 
fluent in sign language.236 In another ASL case from Texas, the appellate court noted that 
“[t]he entire trial was videotaped, and all of the cassettes of the translations were entered 
into evidence for the appellate courts.”237  
These accommodations made for ASL defendants and witnesses have an obvious 
counterpart in the testimony of LEP individuals. Just as the Younghanz court noted that a 
complete record would not exist without the videotaped testimony of the ASL victim, 
without the audio recording of an LEP defendants’ testimony, a complete record is 
impossible.  
B. The Appropriate Standard of Review 
The next barrier to assuring LEP defendants’ constitutional rights is the standard of 
review applied by appellate courts. As evident from Part II of this Comment, most courts 
apply an extremely deferential standard of review—either abuse of discretion or plain 
error. However, because misinterpretations are constitutional errors appearing on the 
record, appellate courts should review the full record, de novo, to determine whether any 
constitutional right was impinged and then determine whether the government shouldered 
its burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Since errors in interpretation can affect defendants’ due process right, the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, the right to present a defense, and the right to testify on 
their own behalf, they are constitutional errors. Constitutional errors are reviewed de 
novo when on the record.238 Since, with an audio or audio-visual recording, the testimony 
of the defendant would appear on the record, appellate courts could review the issue de 
novo and provide the criminal defendant full constitutional protection.  
Courts should also adopt the reasoning of Leiva and perform a bifurcated review of 
these errors.239 Following the Seventh Circuit, courts should review the trial court’s 
application of the Court Interpreter Act or state statutory provision for abuse of 
discretion, because the trial judge is in the best position to determine when an interpreter 
should be used, what style of translation the interpreter provides, and when interpretation 
breaks should be taken. However, errors in interpretation should be reviewed de novo, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
simultaneous digital audio recording of judicial proceedings, often referred to as ‘audio synchronization,’ 
and more commonly known as ‘backup audio media.’ ”). 
235 People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 818–19 (1984) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 751(a)). 
236 Id. 
237 Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 
238 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 642 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) for the proposition that constitutional errors deserve de novo 
review); Mass. Nat’l Bank v. Shinn, 57 N.E. 611, 612 (N.Y. 1900) (noting that an unpreserved question of 
grave public policy will be considered de novo).  
239 United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir. 2016).  
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was done in Leiva, because constitutional errors deserve a more comprehensive review 
and the trial judge is not in a better position within the court system to recognize and 
redress these errors.240 After reviewing the constitutional error, de novo, the appellate 
courts could perform a Chapman standard analysis, as is proper on direct appeal of legal 
issues on the record.241 
C. Application to Federal and State Courts 
With these proposed changes, trial and appellate courts would use court interpreters 
more equitably. At the trial court level, both in state and federal court, the judge would be 
responsible for assuring that non-English testimony is recorded and preserved for the 
record. The judge would make clear that the defendant, his or her attorney, and 
knowledgeable listeners should draw attention to any suspected mistranslation. All 
possible efforts should be made to identify and rectify these errors during the trial.  
At the close of trial, if the defendant is convicted, a record should be compiled, 
including an audio or audio-video file of all non-English trial testimony. If the direct 
appeal attorney suspects mistranslation at this point, a second interpreter should be 
appointed by the court to review and compare the audio file with the court reporter’s 
transcript of the translated testimony. If errors are found, the direct appeal lawyer could 
highlight these constitutional errors in a brief to the appellate court. The appellate court 
would receive a complete record, including the audio or audio-video file, and could make 
its own determination about the quality of the translation by relying on parties’ briefing. 
Performing its review, the appellate court would first consider, de novo, whether any 
error impinged constitutional rights. Assuming there is an indication that constitutional 
rights were violated, the court would then turn to the prosecution’s briefs on appeal and 
determine whether it met its Chapman burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the government cannot satisfy this burden, the appellate court would 
reverse the defendant’s conviction.  
While this procedure would successfully identify and redress mistranslations that 
currently go undetected, courts will likely be resistant and view this change as opening 
the appellate courts to abuse or presenting the possibility for sandbagging.242 In People v. 
Partida, the California appellate court explained its hesitancy to do away with an 
objection requirement to preserve issues of mistranslation for appeal.243 The court 
maintained that this “requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a contrary rule 
would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would permit 
the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a 
                                                 
240 See United States v. Mosley, 759 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that “constitutional arguments 
are reviewed de novo.”) (citing United States v. Robinson, 14 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994)); Hovland, 
supra note 66, at 479 (“It is almost impossible for a trial judge to tell whether an interpretation is 
accurate  .  .  .  .”); Turner, supra note 46, at 150–51 (noting that commentators have suggested that “the 
even more stringent” de novo standard of review “provides defendants with greater substantive 
protections” . . . .). 
241 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
242 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 103 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that defendants 
should be able to seek habeas review of unpreserved constitutional issues because “no rational lawyer 
would risk the ‘sandbagging’ feared by the Court”). 
243 People v. Partida, 122 P.3d 765, 766 (Cal. 2005). 
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conviction would be reversed on appeal.”244 Other courts agree and reveal their 
reluctance to permit appeal of non-preserved errors in interpretation stems from concern 
of abuse of the right to direct appeal.245 For example, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals aired its concern that this policy would permit the criminal defendant to abuse 
the system and appeal based on frivolous claims of inaccurate translation.246  
At first blush these arguments seem reasonable. Perhaps, without an objection 
requirement, defendants and their lawyers would refrain from objecting to errors as a trial 
strategy. However, viewed in context, the concern is specious. An appeal for a criminal 
defendant often means more time in custody, a result that would not outweigh the benefit 
of simply correcting recognized mistranslations immediately and potentially being 
acquitted. The Second Circuit recognized the absurdity of the contention that failure to 
object to misinterpretation could be part of a viable trial strategy. In United States ex rel. 
Negron v. New York the court concluded,  
 
we need not decide on this record whether Negron's lawyer by his silence 
could effectively have waived Negron's right to appropriate access to the 
proceedings by means of adequate translation. There is no indication that 
[the attorney’s] failure to ask for an interpreter to assist Negron was any 
part of his trial strategy. Nor could the motive for such an otherwise self-
defeating strategy have been to deviously set up the case for reversal on 
appeal.247  
Another anticipated concern associated with these changes is that it would 
drastically increase the number of appeals on this issue. Perhaps defendants, grasping at 
straws after conviction, would claim mistranslation where none appeared. While the 
number of appeals may increase, it is speculative to assume the increased number of 
appeals would reflect frivolous appeals. After all, under current law, this claim is almost 
impossible to bring on direct appeal. Errors in interpretation are largely invisible.248 
                                                 
244 Id. at 768 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting People v. Rogers, 579 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Cal. 1978)); see 
also People v. Aguirre, No. B231368, 2012 WL 3332366, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2012) (stating that 
the objection requirement prevents gamesmanship by defendant). 
245 See, e.g., Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (“To allow a defendant to 
remain silent throughout the trial and then, upon being found guilty, to assert a claim of inadequate 
translation would be an open invitation to abuse.”); Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C. 1992) 
(requiring timely and specific objections, the court held that “[l]itigants should not be permitted to keep 
some of their objections in their hip pockets and to disclose them only to the appellate tribunal”) (citing 
Palmer Constr. Co. v. Patouillet, 42 A.2d 273, 274 (D.C. 1945)). 
246 See Gonzalez v. United States, 697 A.2d 819, 823 (D.C. 1997) (adopting Valladeres rationale that 
objection requirement prevents defendants’ abuse of interpretation services). 
247 United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970) (internal citation omitted) 
(citing Wilson v. Bailey, 375 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
248 See Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 999, 1036 (2007) (“The difficulty here, and in all instances of interpretive failure, is that the existence 
of the failure is not directly knowable by either the lawyer or the client, as neither possesses the linguistic 
abilities to verify the integrity of the interpretation. As a result of this black box 
problem, errors in interpretation can only be inferred circumstantially, and even then, only their existence 
and not their cause can be readily appreciated.”);  
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Therefore, the number would necessarily increase. Because of this, it is difficult to 
surmise the number of cases involving errors in interpretation because, without 
mechanisms for detection, they go unnoticed, and constitutional rights are impinged. On 
the other end of the spectrum, even if a small number of cases are impacted by these 
proposed changes, they should still be made because they are crucial to safeguarding 
constitutional rights. Besides, appellate courts retain the right and ability to summarily 
dismiss frivolous claims. In this context, the proclivity of appellate courts to find errors 
harmless would guard against any abuse resulting from these proposed changes.  
To the extent there is concern over the cost of appointing a second interpreter to 
review the record before direct appeal, these considerations must be subordinate to the 
protection of constitutional rights. Further, just as technology permits courts and court 
reporters to easily and inexpensively record the non-English testimony, similar advances 
permit computer programs to aid direct appeal lawyers in identifying potential errors 
before incurring the cost of a second interpreter.249 In this way, the second interpreter 
could have a more limited role. Rather than reviewing the trial court record in its entirety, 
direct appeal lawyers could point the interpreter to specific portions of the record where 
they suspect an error was made. 
CONCLUSION 
While federal and state courts review misinterpretations under different standards, 
their responses are uniform in one significant way—they are deficient in protecting 
defendants’ constitutional rights. Their deficiencies come in different forms. Some courts 
require criminal defendants to object to misinterpretations of a language they do not 
understand. Others take the timely and specific objection requirement beyond its logical 
purpose and require an objection even when the court interpreter admits to the error. 
Several courts reviewing claims of misinterpretation question the defendant’s need for an 
interpreter, and, in doing so, go beyond the proper scope of appellate review.  Perhaps the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Joshua Karton, Lost in Translation: International Criminal Tribunals and the Legal Implications of 
Interpreted Testimony, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 8 (2008) (“It is not known how many errors in 
translation make their way into the record.”). 
249 See, e.g., Lydia D. Johnson, What Does Justice Have to Do with Interpreters in the Jury Room?, 84 
UMKC L. REV. 941, 984 (2016) (listing various courtroom-ready language-translation technologies, 
including “speech recognition software [that] not only decodes speech in a foreign language, but also 
accomplishes this task in real time in a voice that sounds like the recipient’s or the interpreter’s.”); Lisa C. 
Wood, Translation Protocols: The Time Has Come, 29 ANTITRUST 67, 69 (2015) (“Bilingual attorneys or 
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documents. Informal translations can be used to identify key documents and issues, and then software can 
be used to search foreign language documents for additional key documents to be translated in full . . . . 
[T]ranslation firms can help with this culling process.”); see also Tom Simonite, Software Translates Your 
Voice into Another Language, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 9, 2012), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427184/software-translates-your-voice-into-another-language/ 
(noting the value of new technology that replicates tone, voice, and emphasis while translating spoken word 
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most damaging deficiency of all is that the majority of jurisdictions reviewed consider 
misinterpretation a question of fact. Even though deficient interpretation is the functional 
equivalent of no interpretation and implicates core constitutional rights, courts persist in 
reviewing the error for abuse of discretion. In this context, deference is improper because 
the trial judge is substantially incapable of identifying and rectifying errors in 
interpretation and has no advantage over an appellate court review of a complete record. 
Therefore, in showing deference, appellate courts fail in their duty to uphold 
constitutional rights. 
Although the changes proposed in this Comment are significant, they are not out of 
proportion with the harm done to LEP defendants embroiled in criminal trials. Once 
errors in interpretation are examined, it is clear that numerous constitutional rights are 
risked when an interpreter commits an error of misinterpretation. In order to truly remedy 
these issues, non-English testimony must be captured. The fact that courts can achieve 
this easily and inexpensively makes this response all the more urgent and necessary. 
Once these errors are preserved for the record, appellate courts should recognize that 
deference is not reasonable and review these claims de novo, to assure any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With these changes, both appellate and trial courts 
will give LEP defendants a chance at securing justice in the criminal court system and 
prevent infringement of their constitutional rights. 
